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Consolidating Power: Technology,
Ideology, and Philadelphia’s Growth
in the Early Republic
A N DR EW M. SC H O C K E T

Few contemporary American issues are more controversial than the
powerful role of corporations (both business and municipal) in society, politics, and the economy. Yet strikingly, few scholars have investigated the deepest historical roots of American corporate power.
Most historians who have considered this issue have focused their
research on the Gilded Age and beyond because of the post–Civil
War rise of industrial capitalism, the increased prominence of corporations on the national scene, and the dramatic growth of city governments in the context of late nineteenth-century large-scale immigration and the provision of citywide service and transportation
infrastructure.1 Consequently, they have minimized the origins of
American corporate power in the ﬁrst decades of the republic, a crucial issue in the development of American business, American cities,
and the nation.
In this dissertation I examine the ways moneyed Philadelphians
invented corporate power in America during the ﬁrst half-century of
the federal republic, speciﬁcally focusing on business corporations
such as canal companies and banks and on a public corporation,
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1. See for example William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large
Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton, N.J., 1997); Alan Trachtenberg, The
Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York,
1982); and Harold L. Platt, The Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880–1930 (Chicago, 1991).
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Philadelphia’s municipal government. Using evidence from company and municipal records and publications, the private papers and
correspondence of corporate ofﬁcers, newspapers, pamphlets, and
legislative acts and proceedings, I identify the people and the technological and ﬁnancial processes that contributed to the establishment and entrenchment of corporate economic and political power.
I argue that corporate leaders, responding to the demands of the Philadelphia region, used technology, ideology, and ﬁnance to create a
social space, neither public nor private, that I have called the “corporate sphere.”
Early republican Philadelphia provides the perfect site for such
inquiries into the role of corporations in American life. After the
American Revolution, Philadelphia-area residents demanded a better
supply of fresh water, more efﬁcient transportation to and from a
developing hinterland, increased opportunities for cash and credit,
and stable investments. Accordingly, in the 1780s and 1790s prominent Philadelphians turned to a proven British institutional structure
that could provide the framework to address these demands: the corporation. Leaders of business corporations and the city corporation
of Philadelphia—the Quaker City’s municipal government—pioneered the legal, ﬁnancial, technological, ideological, and social
foundations for the spectacular rise of corporate power during the
second half of the nineteenth century. The city was home to America’s ﬁrst incorporated bank (the Bank of North America) and the ﬁrst
and second Bank of the United States, and was becoming a banking
center for the entire Delaware Valley, as well as the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. Philadelphians founded America’s ﬁrst successful
turnpike corporation, its ﬁrst ﬁre insurance corporations, many pioneering marine insurance corporations, and one of its ﬁrst life insurance corporations. They formed some of the nation’s most prominent
internal navigation companies. These companies were testing grounds
for later corporations such as the Pennsylvania Rail Road, which became the quintessential (and largest) American corporation in the
third quarter of the nineteenth century. In addition, the construction
and maintenance of the country’s ﬁrst major municipal waterworks
system, ﬁrst at Centre Square and then at Fairmount, facilitated the
ﬁnancial and administrative growth of the city corporation and served
as a model for other American cities.
Many late eighteenth-century Americans were conﬁdent that their
revolution would result in increased political and economic opportunity for the many while breaking the inﬂuence of local elites. Two
central issues in the study of the early republic have been the intensiﬁcation of market participation—the “market revolution”—and the
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decline of elite authority in both social and political terms.2 The early
republic witnessed a diffusion of local political and social power, as
well as great consolidations of economic and political strength by
holders of great amounts of capital. I argue that business corporations
and large municipal corporations formed a crucial connection between these phenomena by facilitating centralization in some cases
and diffusion in others.
In the Philadelphia region during the ﬁrst third of the nineteenth
century, new physical and ﬁnancial infrastructures allowed many
people to enter the market far more actively than before. The Schuylkill navigation, owned and run by the Schuylkill Navigation Company, made the river passable by boat from the Schuylkill anthracite
ﬁelds to the wharves of Philadelphia, and by doing so led to the
agricultural and industrial development of the entire Schuylkill
River Valley. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company soon did the
same for the Lehigh River. The Philadelphia waterworks provided
not only safe drinking water but also water for brewers, tanners,
soapboilers, inns, and other businesses. Financial institutions such
as the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, the Bank of Pennsylvania, the
Mutual Assurance Company for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire,
and the Philadelphia Contributionship for Insuring Houses from
Loss by Fire made capital available for a wide variety of small- and
large-scale investments. At the same time, the increasing concentration of ownership and control of these projects allowed a small minority to exert increased economic and eventually political inﬂuence
over the great number who used them.
The technologies used by business and municipal corporations
exemplify what I call “nexus technologies,” so labeled because of
their centrality to mass-market economic activity. Early nineteenthcentury corporate boards and municipal councils manipulated nexus
technologies and others’ dependence on those technologies for market participation in order to consolidate capital and to break the
power of local elites, setting both centripetal and centrifugal forces
in motion. Thus, the centralization of capital and political power
and the diffusion of local power were not in any way antithetical:
rather these developments were the necessarily interrelated results
2. See Paul Gilje, ed., Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison, Wisc., 1997); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution:
Jacksonian America, 1815–1846 (New York, 1991); Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s
Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic
(New York, 1995); Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian
America (New York, 1990); and Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution (New York, 1992).
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of the ways that early nineteenth-century Americans exploited nexus
technologies.
Nexus technologies had great potential for extending power across
vast distances. Eighteenth-century American relations were inherently local and personal, based on the extension of family credit and
constant reinforcement through face-to-face encounters—for example, in churches, on court days, at militia musters, and during election campaigns. This personal touch made such inﬂuence difﬁcult to
project over space, but controllers of nexus technology could cast
their shadows as far as their technologies would reach. The Schuylkill Navigation Company’s board of managers made decisions concerning capacity and shipping rates that affected thousands of people living within 20 miles of their navigation, an area of 2,000 square
miles, for the Schuylkill was now the local connection to markets
regional and beyond. The Watering Committee, the subcommittee of
the Philadelphia city corporation that oversaw the Philadelphia
waterworks, enacted taxes and regulations enforced not only within
the city but also throughout the surrounding suburbs. Banks’ discounting policies had broad ramiﬁcations for regional money supply.
More subtly and more profoundly, controllers of nexus technologies
exploited them to create a new kind of power. The employment of
nexus technologies created new dependencies among their customers that did not rely on face-to-face contact. At the same time, thousands of individuals, indeed entire communities, used the canals,
the waterworks, and capital loans to increase their market participation, bypassing local patrons to do so. They now depended on the
continued operation of the infrastructure to protect their newfound
opportunities. Thus, they discovered themselves in an uneasy alliance with the controllers of nexus technologies, even as local patrons
saw their clients and clout slip away.
Corporate leaders also pioneered new ﬁnancial methods to further
their goals. In 1790 Philadelphia had inadequate transportation to
its growing hinterland, no centralized water supply system, and no
institutional methods for ﬁnancing the necessary improvements. Despite demanding these services, the public was unwilling to pay cash
up front for expensive technologies that fostered Philadelphia’s
growth but wanted to reap the rewards of greater economic opportunities. Taxpayers wanted fresh water and better transportation without substantially higher taxes. Accordingly, through the clever use
of a sinking fund supported by bond issues, the city corporation ofﬁcers found a way to eliminate risk for investors. By budgeting for
interest payments rather than for the actual capital expenses of the
waterworks, the corporation insulated ﬁnancial decisions from the
political process. Internal improvement companies did the same by
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offering interest-bearing mortgages to big investors. Banks, meanwhile, served as investments so safe that investors gave managers
great freedom to pursue their own ends. The public reaped the immediate beneﬁts of these investments, but later paid dearly in tolls
and water rents and even more in lost control over some of the most
important institutions governing the city’s economic future. Corporate leaders pioneered ﬁnancial methods that allowed them to amass
capital while shielding their ability to control it.
These corporate leaders understood, however, that they could not
operate in a complete political vacuum. They needed legal sanction
from the state government for their charters and often lobbied for
laws that beneﬁted their operations at the expense of other economic
actors. When they did enter public debate, they manipulated the republican and libertarian strains of early republic rhetoric. On the one
hand, corporate leaders pointed out that their ventures served the
greater community: that the banks, insurance companies, and internal improvements they administered were in the public interest.
Thus, they appealed to a communitarian sense of the general public
interest in their requests for laws that gave the corporations leverage
against other economic interests that ostensibly were less central to
the common weal. On the other hand, when their motives were called
into question, corporate boosters argued that corporations, too, had
an interest, and that the pursuit of that interest was as legitimate as
anyone else’s, reﬂecting a libertarian ethos. By claiming to represent
the public as well as themselves, corporate leaders used seemingly
contradictory terms to buttress the legitimacy of their projects and
actions; this welding of republican and libertarian rhetoric formed a
powerful precedent for the political rhetoric of both business and
municipal corporations in their dealings with state governments.
Despite their efforts to inﬂuence state policy, corporate ofﬁcers
and their friends increasingly found their views, interests, and personal political inﬂuence pushed aside in the rough and tumble of
early republic Pennsylvania politics. Accordingly, they endeavored
to carve out an economic realm—a corporate sphere—beyond the
reach of grasping politicians and hidden from the eyes of a suspicious but equally ﬁckle electorate.3 Corporate board members and
the city councils worked to make their corporations independent
from the state government and to create structures to administer policies among corporations. The banks, for example, began cooperating

3. This is a formulation adapted from Jü rgen Habermas’s consideration of the
“public sphere” as defined in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
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on matters of money supply, effectively setting their own policies
for the state economy. Philadelphia’s corporate leaders also decided
which internal improvement projects they would fund, setting regional development policy. By having its own rules of conduct and
membership and being in many ways shielded from the public, yet
having inﬂuence over economic and political decision making, the
corporate sphere became the third arena of American life.
That the creation of the corporate sphere accelerated the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies of American political economy became
the fatal irony of the republican vision of America. Expansion
through space, republicans hoped, would forestall the United States
from evolving into an industrial state by keeping power locally structured and restraining the growth of cities, with their armies of dependent workers. To spread across the land, however, people needed
credit and internal improvements to keep their connections with urban and overseas markets. Everyday farmers as well as ambitious
tradespeople did help to break the power of their patron elites, but
they did so at the expense of falling under the inﬂuence of the even
greater power of the corporations that controlled access to the wider
world. The early nineteenth-century phenomena of centralization,
diffusion, and decline of patron-client relations were not independent or contradictory events: they were the complementary effects of
the rise of corporations.
Such effects manifested themselves in a variety of ways. Lehigh
Coal and Navigation Company president Josiah White could successfully exhort hundreds of men who depended on the company for a
living to sign petitions to the Pennsylvania General Assembly supporting legislation that favored the corporation over the mill owners
who previously ran their counties. Furthermore, the village around
which the corporation’s mining operations centered, Mauch Chunk,
grew exponentially but became a company town far more oppressive
than any regime that local patrons might have imagined. Manufacturers in Philadelphia’s northern suburbs exploited the availability
of water from the waterworks to run their steam engines, while the
city’s government used regulations over water distribution to bring
suburban governments into the big city’s orbit. In addition, printers
who were able to expand their businesses through bank credit found
themselves reluctant to criticize banks lest the banks call in their
loans. Corporate leaders created new opportunities but constrained
others.
In this project I integrate the scholarship of business, economic,
and legal history, the history of technology, and the history of the
early republic, positing insights made by no one of these disciplines
alone. Most signiﬁcantly, I argue that the creation of the corporate
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sphere held serious consequences for the legacy of the American
Revolution. Philadelphia corporations provided broader political
and economic independence for many people; indeed, these companies grew because of the great demand for their services. They sponsored and fostered great regional economic growth. Still, as corporate
insiders consolidated their hold over institutions, they gained command over the direction of that growth and the distribution of its
rewards. Through consolidation of public power and control of local
infrastructures, Philadelphians made their city a corporate capital.
These phenomena, as much as any others, transformed America from
a gentry-dominated society in the eighteenth century to the corporate-dominated one of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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